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Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
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DOI：10.1257/jel.20161153.png)
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摘要
En 中文
This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that compensation results from rent extraction by CEOs. However, more modern shareholder value theories, that arguably better capture the CEO setting, do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research.
Keyword:
CEO PAY
CONTINUOUS-TIME
STOCK-OPTIONS
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
LIMITED-LIABILITY
MORAL HAZARD
1ST-ORDER APPROACH
PERFORMANCE PAY
SECURITY DESIGN
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
10.6
论文数:
689
被引数:
1.3W
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