.png){kind=icon}
返回
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
摘要
En 中文
This paper analyzes the characteristics and impact of loans made to executives for stock purchase, option exercise, and relocation. We find that loans made to assist executives in purchasing stock or exercising options are larger and have higher interest rates than relocation loans. All types of loans, however, are issued at below-market interest rates, on average. We also find that while stock purchase loans are given to managers with low existing ownership, option exercise loans are given to managers with high existing ownership and high cash compensation. Finally, our results indicate that executive stock ownership increases following stock purchase and option exercise loans. For managers as a whole, a loan that enables a manager to buy 100 shares of stock results in only an eight-share increase in ownership. However, the relation between ownership changes and stock purchase loans is much stronger for low ownership managers.
Keyword:
OWNERSHIP
STOCK
CONSEQUENCES
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
2.8
论文数:
2.3K
被引数:
1.0W
机构
暂无机构信息
引用论文
Taking stock: Equity-based compensation and the evolution of managerial ownership.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏分享收藏
没有更多内容
没有更多内容