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Extensions on sequentially optimal mechanisms
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DOI：10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00409.x.png)
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摘要
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This paper establishes that posting a price in each period is a revenue-maximizing allocation mechanism in a finite period model without commitment. A risk-neutral seller has one object to sell and faces a risk-neutral buyer whose valuation is private information and drawn from an arbitrary bounded subset of the real line. The seller has all the bargaining power: she designs a mechanism to sell the object at t, but if trade does not occur at t she can propose another mechanism at t + 1. We show that posting a price in each period is an optimal mechanism. A methodological contribution of the paper is to develop a procedure to characterize optimal dynamic incentive schemes under non-commitment that is valid irrespective of the structure of the agent's type.
Keyword:
COMMITMENT
DYNAMICS
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6.4
论文数:
2.5K
被引数:
2.1W
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