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External Governance and Debt Structure
DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhy112.png)
摘要
En 中文
This paper examines how external governance pressure affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent with a governance mechanism substitution effect, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in governance pressure from the product (takeover) market has a significant negative (positive) impact on the use of bank (public debt) financing over public debt (bank loan) issuance. Tests using changes in the strictness of loan covenants provide corroborative evidence. These findings are consistent with the notion that firms endogenously substitute governance mechanisms and that demand for creditor governance depends on the relative strength of alternative external governance mechanisms.
Keyword:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
PRIVATE DEBT
PUBLIC DEBT
STATE LAWS
BANK LOANS
CHOICE
INFORMATION
COMPETITION
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期刊
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.0W
机构
引用论文
Institutional and Legal Context in Natural Experiments: The Case of State Antitakeover Laws自然实验中的制度和法律背景: 国家反收购法的案例
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
IF9.5

