arrow
返回

External Governance and Debt Structure

delete2019-06-04
delete43
delete
OA
AI
S
Sreedhar T. Bharath *
M
Michael G. Hertzel
DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhy112delete
delete原文链接
delete分享
delete收藏
查看原文
摘要

摘要

En 中文
This paper examines how external governance pressure affects the type of debt that firms issue. Consistent with a governance mechanism substitution effect, we find that an exogenous increase (decrease) in governance pressure from the product (takeover) market has a significant negative (positive) impact on the use of bank (public debt) financing over public debt (bank loan) issuance. Tests using changes in the strictness of loan covenants provide corroborative evidence. These findings are consistent with the notion that firms endogenously substitute governance mechanisms and that demand for creditor governance depends on the relative strength of alternative external governance mechanisms.
Keyword:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION
PRIVATE DEBT
PUBLIC DEBT
STATE LAWS
BANK LOANS
CHOICE
INFORMATION
COMPETITION
AI总结

AI总结

对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取,主要内容包括:简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。

期刊

Review of Financial Studies 封面图
Review of Financial Studies
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.0W

机构

A
Arizona State University
学者数:
2.7W
论文数: 2.5W
被引数: 4.2W
引用论文

引用论文

err分享
err收藏
The effect of state laws on capital structure
err2007-02-01
err73
PREAI
errWald, John K.; Long, Michael S.
err分享
err收藏
Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value
err2012-03-13
err441
PREAI
errNini, Greg; Smith, David C.; Sufi, Amir
err分享
err收藏
学者 查看更多内容