arrow
返回

Fairness and contract design

delete2007-01-01
delete273
delete
OA
AI
E
Ernst Fehr *
A
Alexander Klein
K
Klaus M. Schmidt
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.xdelete
delete原文链接
delete分享
delete收藏
查看原文
摘要

摘要

En 中文
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.
Keyword:
moral hazard
incentives
bonus contract
trust contract
fairness
inequity aversion
AI总结

AI总结

对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取,主要内容包括:简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。

期刊

Econometrica 封面图
Econometrica
IF:
7.1
论文数:
3.0K
被引数:
4.3W

机构

暂无机构信息
引用论文

引用论文

err分享
err收藏
Low gastric acid as a rise factor for cholera transmission: Application of a new non-invasive gastric acid field test
err1990-01-01
err0
PREAI
errF.P.L. Van Loon; J.D. Clemens; M. Shahrier; D.A. Sack; C.B. Stefhensen; M.R. Khan; G.H. Rabbani; M.R. Rao; A.K. Banik
err分享
err收藏
err分享
err收藏
Which navigation when?
err2004-06-01
err0
PREAI
errTobias Hüfner; Florian Gebhard; Paul A. Grützner; Peter Messmer; Ulrich Stöckle; Christian Krettek
err分享
err收藏
Computer‐assisted fluoroscopy‐based reduction of femoral fractures and antetorsion correction
err2000-01-01
err0
PREAI
errR. Hofstetter; M. Slomczykowski; C. Krettek; G. Köppen; M. Sati; L.‐P. Nolte
err分享
err收藏
学者 查看更多内容