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Financial system architecture
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DOI：10.1093/rfs/10.3.693.png)
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This article builds a theory of financial system architecture. We ask: what is a financial market, what is a bank, and what determines the economic role of each? Starting with basic assumptions about primitives-the types of agents and the nature of informational asymmetries-we provide a theory that explains which agents coalesce to form banks and which trade in the capital market. It is shown that borrowers of higher observable qualities access the financial market. Moreover a financial system in its infancy will be bank-dominated and increased financial market sophistication diminishes bank lending.
Keyword:
MORAL HAZARD
BANK LOANS
INFORMATION
ECONOMIES
MARKETS
INTERMEDIATION
CHOICE
RENEGOTIATION
EQUILIBRIUM
REPUTATION
期刊
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.0W
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