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GLOBAL GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
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DOI：10.2307/2951491.png)
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摘要
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A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that, when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global game forces the players to conform to Harsanyi and Selten's risk dominance criterion.
Keyword:
GLOBAL GAMES
EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
RISK DOMINANCE
PAYOFF UNCERTAINTY
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
COMMON KNOWLEDGE
ITERATED DOMINANCE
