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High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect
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DOI：10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02256.x.png)
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摘要
En 中文
Consider a firm which pays a (credit-constrained) worker for his effort over two periods. The more the firm pays in one period, the wealthier is the worker in the following period, and so the more he must then be paid for a given effort. We describe the profit-maximising contract under these conditions, showing how this wealth-ratchet effect can raise wages over time, and cause the firm to fire older workers.
Keyword:
OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
SHORT-TERM
LONG-TERM
WAGES
PRODUCTIVITY
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3.6
论文数:
5.5K
被引数:
1.6W
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