Hotelling meets Weber

doi:10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.09.001

2012-11-01

PRE

Fu‐Chuan Lai

Takatoshi Tabuchi *

DOI：10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2011.09.001

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摘要

En 中文

In this paper, spatial competition between two sellers in a market (Hotelling, 1929) and total transportation costs minimization (Weber, 1909) are combined, and equilibrium and optimum locations of firms are analyzed along with the consequent policy implications. We show that when the output prices are fixed and equal, both firms agglomerate at the market center, irrespective of the distribution of inputs. Further, we also show that when output price is endogenous, the middle point of firm locations in Hotelling's model is identical to the Weber point. Finally, we show that the locations of Hotelling's firms are far from the socially optimal location. (C) 2011 Elsevier BM. All rights reserved.

Keyword:

Hotelling

Weber

Location competition

Social welfare