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Identification of first-price auctions with endogenous entry and possibly biased beliefs
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DOI：10.1016/j.jeconom.2026.106248.png)
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Abstract
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This paper studies identification of first-price auctions where bidders enter auctions endogenously and may have biased beliefs about the valuation distribution. We analyze the symmetric independent private setup under three commonly used entry models. In the Levin-Smith entry model, the primitives are point-identified. In the Samuelson entry model, the primitives are identified only on a subset of the support of valuations. In the arbitrarily selective entry model, the primitives are partially identified in general but can be point-identified with exogenous variation in both the number of potential bidders and an entry cost shifter.
Keywords:
first-price auctions
endogenous entry
biased beliefs
identification
auction theory
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