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Incentive-driven attacker for corrupting two-party protocols
DOI:10.1007/s00500-018-3342-3.png)
摘要
En 中文
Adversaries in two-party computation may sabotage a protocol, leading to possible collapse of the information security management. In practice, attackers often breach security protocols with specific incentives. For example, attackers manage to reap additional rewards by sabotaging computing tasks between two clouds. Unfortunately, most of the existing research works neglect this aspect when discussing the security of protocols. Furthermore, the construction of corrupting two parties is also missing in two-party computation. In this paper, we propose an incentive-driven attacking model where the attacker leverages corruption costs, benefits and possible consequences. We here formalize the utilities used for two-party protocols and the attacker(s), taking into account both corruption costs and attack benefits. Our proposed model can be considered as the extension of the seminal work presented by Groce and Katz (Annual international conference on the theory and applications of cryptographic techniques, Springer, Berlin, pp 81-98, 2012), while making significant contribution in addressing the corruption of two parties in two-party protocols. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to model the corruption of both parties in two-party protocols.
Keyword:
Cost corruption
Incentive-driven adversary
Two-party computation
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2.5
论文数:
1.0W
被引数:
2.1W
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