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Indirect Insider Trading

delete2022-10-11
delete3
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OA
AI
B
Brad Goldie
C
Chao Jiang
P
Paul D. Koch *
M
M. Babajide Wintoki
DOI:10.1017/S0022109022001119delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
Insiders must disclose indirect trades made through accounts they control, including family, trust, retirement, and foundation accounts. Indirect trades through these accounts are more profitable than direct trades in the insider's own account. They are also more likely to be made by opportunistic insiders who make nonroutine trades, or who trade profitably before earnings announcements, or who have a short investment horizon. These trades contain more predictive information about earnings surprises and large price changes, and they tend to be made by insiders at firms with high information asymmetry. Insiders also make fewer indirect trades following periods of intense regulatory scrutiny.
Keyword:
INFORMATION-CONTENT
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
STOCK-PRICES
PROFITS
ASYMMETRY
SECURITY
RETURNS
REFLECT
MARKETS
SECTION

期刊

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 封面图
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
IF:
2.8
论文数:
2.3K
被引数:
1.0W

机构

U
University System of Ohio
学者数:
15.5W
论文数: 13.0W
被引数: 200
U
university of south carolina columbia
学者数:
9.6K
论文数: 8.5K
被引数: 7
M
Miami University
学者数:
2.5K
论文数: 2.0K
被引数: 4.2K
U
University of South Carolina System
学者数:
1.6W
论文数: 1.5W
被引数: 27
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