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Inefficient mergers
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DOI：10.1016/j.jbankfin.2019.105648.png)
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摘要
En 中文
Although complementarity between products and/or technologies of bidders and targets is considered a key driver of M&A deals, many observed mergers are inefficient: Complementarity gains in actual mergers are lower than the gains that could have been obtained were the targets acquired by different bidders. In this paper we propose a possible reason for the existence of inefficient mergers, which is based on search and information frictions. Our model examines three such frictions: target's obsolescence risk, difficulties in evaluating complementarity gains, and competitive interaction among potential bidders in output markets. We test the model's predictions using two established measures of complementarity gains in mergers: product similarity and technological overlap. Both sets of tests indicate that the degree of inefficiency in observed M&As is related to targets' and bidders' characteristics in ways consistent with the model's predictions. More generally, our results suggest that search and value discovery are important determinants of merger outcomes. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
M&As
Complementarities
Product similarity
Technological overlap
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被引数:
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