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Inequality and social discounting

delete2007-06-01
delete93
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OA
AI
E
Emmanuel Farhi *
I
Iván Werning
DOI:10.1086/518741delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We explore steady-state inequality in air intergenerational model with altruistically linked individuals who experience privately observed taste shocks. When the welfare function depends only on the initial generation, efficiency requires immiseration: inequality grows without bound and everyone's consumption converges to zero. We study other efficient allocations in which the welfare function values future generations directly, placing a positive but vanishing weight on their welfare. The social discount factor is then higher than the private one, and for an), such difference we find that consumption exhibits mean reversion and that a steady-state, cross-sectional distribution for consumption and welfare exists, with no one trapped at misery.
Keyword:
REPEATED MORAL HAZARD
INFORMATION

期刊

Journal of Political Economy 封面图
Journal of Political Economy
IF:
6.3
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
3.2W

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