Informed Information Design

doi:10.1086/724843

Informed Information Design

2023-11-01

4

OA

AI

DOI：10.1086/724843

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摘要

En 中文

We study informed persuasion, whereby a privately informed designer without ex ante commitment power chooses disclosure mechanisms to influence agents' actions. We characterize the subset of Bayes-correlated equilibria yielding every designer type a payoff higher than what they could get from any disclosure mechanism with credible beliefs. This set of interim-optimal mechanisms is nonempty and tractable, and all its elements are perfect Bayesian equilibrium mechanisms of the informed-designer game. Interim-optimal mechanisms are characterized via belief-based approaches in pure persuasion settings. We identify single- and multiagent interactive environments in which ex ante-optimal mechanisms are interim optimal.

Keyword:

PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIP

BAYESIAN PERSUASION

CORRELATED EQUILIBRIUM

MECHANISM DESIGN

GAMES

THEOREMS

Informed Information Design

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