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Insuring Nonverifiable Losses*
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OA
AI
DOI：10.1093/rof/rft056.png)
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摘要
En 中文
Insurance contracts are often complex and difficult to verify outside the insurance relation. We show that standard one-period insurance policies with an upper limit and a deductible are the optimal incentive-compatible contracts in a competitive market with repeated interaction. Optimal group insurance policies involve a joint upper limit and individual deductibles; insurance brokers can play a role implementing such contracts for their clients. Our model provides new insights and predictions about the determinants of insurance.
Keyword:
INSURANCE MARKETS
CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS
ADVERSE SELECTION
MORAL HAZARD
CONTRACTS
RISK
DEBT
DESIGN
EQUILIBRIUM
INFORMATION
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期刊
IF:
8.4
论文数:
910
被引数:
4.8K
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