.png){kind=icon}
返回
Intergenerational Insurance
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1086/730206.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
How should successive generations insure each other when the young can default on previously promised transfers to the old? This paper studies intergenerational insurance that maximizes the expected discounted utility of all generations subject to participation constraints for each generation. If complete insurance is unattainable, the optimal intergenerational insurance is history dependent even when the environment is stationary. The risk from a generational shock is spread into the future with periodic resetting. If we interpret intergenerational insurance in terms of debt, the fiscal reaction function is nonlinear and the risk premium on debt is lower than the risk premium with complete insurance.
Keyword:
OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
SOCIAL-SECURITY
DEBT SUSTAINABILITY
MORAL HAZARD
RISK
INSTITUTIONS
SOLVENCY
MODELS
MARKET
US
期刊
IF:
6.3
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
3.2W
机构
引用论文
Reactivity of carbon nucleophiles with disubstituted tricarbonyl(pentadienyl)iron(1+) cations: Application to the synthesis of lasiol and epi-lasiol.png)
Tetrahedron
TetrahedronIF0
PREAI
分享收藏
Sovereign Debt Sustainability and Central Bank Credibility主权债务可持续性与中央银行信誉financial economics
financial economicsIF5.2
PREAI
分享收藏分享收藏分享收藏
查看更多内容