.png){kind=icon}
返回
Killer Acquisitions
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1086/712506.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
This paper argues that incumbent firms may acquire innovative targets solely to discontinue the target's innovation projects and preempt future competition. We call such acquisitions killer acquisitions. We develop a model illustrating this phenomenon. Using pharmaceutical industry data, we show that acquired drug projects are less likely to be developed when they overlap with the acquirer's existing product portfolio, especially when the acquirer's market power is large because of weak competition or distant patent expiration. Conservative estimates indicate that 5.3%-7.4% of acquisitions in our sample are killer acquisitions. These acquisitions disproportionately occur just below thresholds for antitrust scrutiny.
Keyword:
RESEARCH-AND-DEVELOPMENT
MEDICARE PART D
DRUG DEVELOPMENT
PRICE CONTROLS
MARKET-SIZE
INNOVATION
ENTRY
MERGERS
COMPETITION
INCENTIVES
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
6.3
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
3.2W
机构
引用论文
分享收藏分享收藏分享收藏Occurrence and characterization of peptaibols from Trichoderma citrinoviride, an endophytic fungus of cork oak, using electrospray ionization quadrupole time-of-flight mass spectrometry.png)
Microbiology
OAAI
MicrobiologyIF0
OAAI分享收藏
查看更多内容