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Language-based information-flow security
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DOI：10.1109/JSAC.2002.806121.png)
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摘要
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Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Recently, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this paper, we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of recent work in the area and identify some important open challenges.
Keyword:
computer security
concurrency
confidentiality
covert channels
information flow
noninterference
security policies
security-type systems
期刊
IF:
17.2
论文数:
6.4K
被引数:
3.1W
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