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Large robust games

delete2004-11-01
delete115
PRE
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E
Ehud Kalai *
DOI:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00549.xdelete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.
Keyword:
anonymous games
Nash equilibrium
Bayesian equilibrium
robust equilibrium
ex post Nash
purification
rational expectations
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Econometrica
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被引数:
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