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摘要
En 中文
With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modifications include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments, multiple revisions of choices, cheap talk announcements, and more.
Keyword:
anonymous games
Nash equilibrium
Bayesian equilibrium
robust equilibrium
ex post Nash
purification
rational expectations
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IF:
7.1
论文数:
3.0K
被引数:
4.3W
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引用论文
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