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Learning and Complementarities in Speculative Attacks
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DOI：10.1093/restud/rdq017.png)
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We study a model where the aggregate trading of currency speculators reveals new information to the central bank and affects its policy decision. We show that the learning process gives rise to coordination motives among speculators leading to large currency attacks and introducing non-fundamental volatility into exchange rates and policy decisions. We show that the central bank can improve the ex ante effectiveness of its policy by committing to put a lower weight ex post on the information from the market, and that transparency may either increase or decrease the effectiveness of learning from the market, depending on how it is implemented.
Keyword:
Currency attacks
Financial markets
Global games
Strategic complementarities
Heterogenous information
Learning
coordination
Feedback effect
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Social value of public information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) is actually pro-transparency, not con.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
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