.png){kind=icon}
返回
Leverage Dynamics without Commitment
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1111/jofi.13001.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
We characterize equilibrium leverage dynamics in a trade-off model in which the firm can continuously adjust leverage and cannot commit to a policy ex ante. While the leverage ratchet effect leads shareholders to issue debt gradually over time, asset growth and debt maturity cause leverage to mean-revert slowly toward a target. Investors anticipate future debt issuance and raise credit spreads, fully offsetting the tax benefits of new debt. Shareholders are therefore indifferent toward the debt maturity structure, even though their choice significantly affects credit spreads, leverage levels, the speed of adjustment, future investment, and growth.
Keyword:
OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE
CORPORATE-DEBT
RISK
LIQUIDITY
MATURITY
期刊
IF:
9.5
论文数:
4.0K
被引数:
5.0W
机构
引用论文
分享收藏分享收藏A Unified Theory of Tobin's q, Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
OAAI
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
OAAI分享收藏
查看更多内容