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摘要
En 中文
With cheap talk, more can be achieved by long conversations than by a single message-even when one side is strictly better informed than the other. (Cheap talk means plain conversation-unmediated, nonbinding, and payoff-irrelevant.) This work characterizes the equilibrium payoffs for all two-person games in which one side is better informed than the other and cheap talk is permitted.
Keyword:
cheap talk
communication
long conversation
incomplete information
game theory
signalling
joint lottery
dimartingale
di-span
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期刊
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7.1
论文数:
3.0K
被引数:
4.3W
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