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Managers, workers, and corporate control
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DOI：10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00748.x.png)
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摘要
En 中文
If management has high private benefits and a small equity stake, managers and workers are natural allies against takeover threats. Two forces are at play. First, managers can transform employees into a shark repellent through long-term labor contracts and thereby reduce the firm's attractiveness to raiders. Second, employees can act as white squires for the incumbent managers. To protect their high wages, they resist hostile takeovers by refusing to sell their shares to the raider or by lobbying against the takeover. The model predicts that wages are inversely correlated with the managerial equity stake, and decline after takeovers.
Keyword:
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS
TAKEOVER
GOVERNANCE
WEALTH
LABOR
FIRM
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期刊
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9.5
论文数:
4.0K
被引数:
5.0W
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