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MANAGING EXPECTATIONS: INSTRUMENTS VERSUS TARGETS

delete2020-12-16
delete11
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Angeletos, George-Marios *
S
Sastry, Karthik A.
DOI:10.1093/qje/qjaa045delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
Should policy communications aim at anchoring expectations of the policy instrument (keep interest rates at zero until date tau) or of the targeted outcome (do whatever it takes to bring unemployment down to y%)? We study how the optimal approach depends on a departure from rational expectations. People have limited depth of knowledge and rationality, or form otherwise distorted beliefs about the behavior of others and the general equilibrium (GE) effects of policy. The bite of this distortion on implementability and welfare is minimized by target-based guidance if and only if GE feedback is strong enough. This offers a rationale for why central banks should shine the spotlight on unemployment when faced with a prolonged liquidity trap, a steep Keynesian cross, or a large financial accelerator.
Keyword:
MONETARY-POLICY
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION
INTEREST-RATES
SOCIAL VALUE
INFORMATION
MODEL
DISCRETION
GUIDANCE
PRICES
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期刊

Quarterly Journal of Economics 封面图
Quarterly Journal of Economics
IF:
12.7
论文数:
1.2K
被引数:
4.1W

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