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摘要
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We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new law of aggregate demand for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.
Keyword:
LEVEL LABOR-MARKETS
STABLE MATCHINGS
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS
GROSS SUBSTITUTES
STABILITY
DESIGN
ALLOCATION
PHYSICIANS
MECHANISM
CONFLICT
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11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
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AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
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