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Matching with Externalities
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DOI：10.1093/restud/rdac032.png)
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We incorporate externalities into the stable matching theory of two-sided markets. Extending the classical substitutes condition to markets with externalities, we establish that stable matchings exist when agent choices satisfy substitutability. We show that substitutability is a necessary condition for the existence of a stable matching in a maximal-domain sense and provide a characterization of substitutable choice functions. In addition, we extend the standard insights of matching theory, like the existence of side-optimal stable matchings and the deferred acceptance algorithm, to settings with externalities even though the standard fixed-point techniques do not apply.
Keyword:
Matching with externalities
Deferred acceptance algorithm
Substitutability
Labour markets with couples
C78
D47
D62
期刊
IF:
6.4
论文数:
2.5K
被引数:
2.1W
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