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Misselling through Agents
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DOI：10.1257/aer.99.3.883.png)
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This paper analyzes the implications of the inherent conflict between two tasks performed by direct marketing agents: prospecting for customers and advising on the products suitability for the specific needs of customers. When structuring salesforce compensation, firms trade off the expected losses from misselling unsuitable products with the agency costs of providing marketing incentives. We characterize how the equilibrium amount of misselling (and thus the scope of policy intervention) depends on features of the agency problem including: the internal organization of a firm's sales process, the transparency of its commission structure, and the steepness of its agents' sales incentives. (JEL M31, M37, M52)
Keyword:
INFORMATION-TRANSMISSION
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
DELEGATED EXPERTISE
COMPETITION
DESIGN
期刊
IF:
11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W
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引用论文
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Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry
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