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Modularity is a concept central to cognitive science, and Fodor's analysis of cognitive modularity in his book The Modularity Of Mind has been widely influential widely misunderstood. It is often claimed that the possession of some or other system-property is a necessary condition for that system to be modular in Fodor's sense, but Fodor made it clear that he was not proposing a definition of modularity, nor proposing any necessary conditions for the applicability of the term. He was simply suggesting a number of system properties that are typical of modular systems. I argue that it is nevertheless possible to derive a useful definition of modularity from the inds of arguments put forward by Fodor: A cognitive system is modular when and only when it is domain-specific. Given any such proposed module, the other features of modularity discussed by Fodor should be dealt with as empirical issues: for each feature (innateness, for example), it is an empirical question whether or not the proposed module has that feature.
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