.png){kind=icon}
返回
Network competition and entry deterrence
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02167.x.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort the access charge upwards.
Keyword:
SEQUENTIAL ENTRY
ACCESS
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
3.6
论文数:
5.5K
被引数:
1.6W
机构
引用论文
GRAF.png)
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies
Proceedings of the 17th International Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and TechnologiesIF0
PREAI
分享收藏
查看更多内容