.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
返回
Network interconnection in telecommunications
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1111/1468-0297.00304.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
This paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive set-Lice. Two scenarios are considered: (i) the case of a symmetric, unregulated industry, and (ii) the case of an industry with a dominant, regulated incumbent In the first, provided there is sufficient product differentiation, it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit-maximising outcome. In the second a formula for the welfare-maximizing interconnection charge is derived. Relations with the 'efficient component pricing rule' are discussed.
Keyword:
ACCESS
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。