arrow
返回

Non-Bayesian Persuasion

delete2022-10-01
delete5
PRE
AI
G
Geoffroy de Clippel *
X
Xu Zhang
DOI:10.1086/720464delete
delete原文链接
delete原文求助
delete分享
delete收藏
摘要

摘要

En 中文
Following Kamenica and Gentzkow, this paper studies persuasion as an information design problem. We investigate how mistakes in probabilistic inference impact optimal persuasion. The concavification method is shown to extend naturally to a large class of belief updating rules, which we identify and characterize. This class comprises many non-Bayesian models discussed in the literature. We apply this new technique to gain insight into the revelation principle, the ranking of updating rules, when persuasion is beneficial to the sender, and when it is detrimental to the receiver. Our key result also extends to shed light on the question of robust persuasion.
Keyword:
MODEL

期刊

Journal of Political Economy 封面图
Journal of Political Economy
IF:
6.3
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
3.2W

机构

B
Brown University
学者数:
2.4W
论文数: 2.2W
被引数: 3.2W
H
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou)
学者数:
1.0K
论文数: 866
被引数: 1
引用论文

引用论文

Pulmonary Artery Sarcoma
err1990-07-01
err0
PREAI
errJeffrey C. Weinreb; Sheila D. Davis; Yahya M. Berkmen; Wayne Isom; David P. Naidich
err分享
err收藏
err分享
err收藏
err分享
err收藏
Attention Management
err2020-03-01
err40
PREAI
errLipnowski, Elliot; Mathevet, Laurent; Wei, Dong
err分享
err收藏
A Theory of Non-Bayesian Social Learning一种非贝叶斯社会学习理论
err2018-03-31
err103
PREAI
errMolavi, Pooya; Tahbaz-Salehi, Alireza; Jadbabaie, Ali
err分享
err收藏
A MODEL OF NONBELIEF IN THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS
err2015-06-04
err40
errOAAI
errBenjamin, Daniel J.; Rabin, Matthew; Raymond, Collin
err分享
err收藏
学者 查看更多内容