.png){kind=icon}
返回
Nonparametric adverse selection problems
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1023/A:1021001917492.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
This article is devoted to adverse selection problems in which individual private information is a whole utility function and cannot be reduced to some finite-dimensional parameter. In this case, incentive-compatibility conditions can be conveniently expressed using some abstract convexity notions arising for instance in Mass Transfer Theory. After this characterization is provided, an existence result of optimal incentive-compatible contracts is proved. Finally, several economic examples are considered including applications to regulation and labor contracting.
Keyword:
principal-agent problems
contract theory
abstract convex analysis
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
