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Optimal contracts when enforcement is a decision variable
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DOI：10.1111/1468-0262.00095.png)
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摘要
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This paper analyzes choice-theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur. An intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism in which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions. The goal of the analysis is to characterize the effect of choice-theoretic costly enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts. The paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is limited and costly enforcement is a decision variable (Theorem 1). In contrast, stochastic contracts are optimal when agents can commit to the ex-ante optimal decisions (Theorem 2). The paper also shows that the costly state verification model can be viewed as a reduced form of an enforcement model in which agents choose payments and strategies as part of a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Keyword:
contracts
enforcement
limited commitment
costly state verification
debt
stochastic monitoring
time consistency
renegotiation
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7.1
论文数:
3.0K
被引数:
4.3W
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