.png){kind=icon}
返回
Optimal foresight
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jmoneco.2020.11.001.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
Agents have foresight when they receive information about a random process above and beyond the information contained in its current and past history. In this paper, we propose an information-theoretic measure of the quantity of foresight in an information structure, and show how to separate informational assumptions about foresight from physical assumptions about the dynamics of the processes itself. We then develop a theory of endogenous foresight in which the type of foresight is chosen optimally by economic agents. In a prototypical dynamic model of consumption and saving, we derive a closed-form solution to the optimal foresight problem. ? 2020 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keyword:
Expectations
News
Information choice
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
4.1
论文数:
3.2K
被引数:
1.1W
机构
引用论文
分享收藏分享收藏分享收藏Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
OAAI
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
OAAI分享收藏
查看更多内容