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摘要
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Consider a system that is modeled as an M/M/1 queueing system with multiple user classes. Each class is characterized by its delay cost per unit of time, its expected service time and its demand function. This paper derives a pricing mechanism which is optimal and incentive-compatible in the sense that the arrival rates and execution priorities jointly maximize the expected net value of the system while being determined, on a decentralized basis, by individual users. A closed-form expression for the resulting price structure is presented and studied.
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