.png){kind=icon}
返回
Optimal taxation: full-commitment versus time-consistent equilibrium
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1007/s10644-020-09265-w.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
This paper examines the properties of the optimal tax mix under different types of policy equilibria and tries to narrow the gap between what the theory suggests and what the actual data show. To do so, we use a two-period deterministic version of the standard neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. In particular, we search for the socially optimal mix of taxes on capital and labour income when the government is able to commit to future policies. Then, we compare this solution to the case in which the government cannot commit to future policies. We show that the optimal tax mix is closer to the actual data in the former case. Furthermore, we show that the lack of commitment creates the incentive for a degree of capitalist bias on the part of the government.
Keyword:
Optimal taxation
Efficiency
Inequality
H21
E62
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
4.3
论文数:
860
被引数:
1.9K
机构
暂无机构信息
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享收藏
分享收藏
查看更多内容