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Optimizing Reward Mechanism in Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares Mining Pools under Block Withholding Attacks
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DOI：10.1016/j.bcra.2026.100540.png)
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Abstract
En 中文
Block Withholding (BWH) attacks with strategic delays pose a significant threat to blockchain/cryptocurrency mining pools using Pay-Per-Last-N-Shares (PPLNS) reward mechanisms. This paper develops an analytical framework to characterize optimal attack strategies and design effective countermeasures. We derive closed-form solutions for optimal delay times, revealing that while theoretical delays can reach 200-300 seconds for short-term miners, long-term participants face prohibitive opportunity costs that naturally limit attack incentives. Our analysis identifies medium-sized, intermittent miners (10-80% of pool hash rate) as the primary threat vector. To mitigate these attacks, we propose an improved PPLNS mechanism that introduces calibrated extra rewards (8-14% of block value) to block finders while maintaining fairness constraints. Through numerical analysis using realistic Bitcoin parameters, we demonstrate that this mechanism reduces expected delays by over 90% (from ~230 seconds to under 2 seconds) with minimal impact on variance reduction benefits. We also provide practical implementation guidance including Bayesian parameter estimation methods for pools operating under information constraints. Our results show that BWH attacks, while theoretically concerning, have limited impact under realistic conditions and can be effectively managed through targeted monitoring and our proposed reward adjustments.
Keywords:
Mining pool
PPLNS
Block Withholding attack
Strategic behavior
Efficiency optimization
Journal
IF:
5.6
Papers:
310
Citations:
754
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