.png){kind=icon}
返回
Ownership structure and target returns
.png){kind=icon}
PRE
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.002.png)
.png){kind=icon}
原文求助.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
Contrary to past literature, ownership defined as all officers and directors of the target firm has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director) ownership has a negative relation with target returns. Using accounting-based versus market-based performance measures, we find that the relation between inside ownership and target returns is best explained by takeover anticipation. Using bidder and synergy returns we find that the relation between outside ownership and target returns is best explained by outsiders' willingness to share gains with the bidder. While the relations are more pronounced for non-tender deals, they also hold for tender offers when active-outside ownership is corporate rather than institutional. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Target returns
Ownership
Acquisitions
Firm value
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
5.9
论文数:
2.6K
被引数:
2.0W
机构
引用论文
THE DISTRIBUTION OF TARGET OWNERSHIP AND THE DIVISION OF GAINS IN SUCCESSFUL TAKEOVERS.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
分享收藏分享收藏分享收藏
查看更多内容