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Probabilistic Game-Theoretic Traffic Routing
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DOI：10.1109/TITS.2024.3399112.png)
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摘要
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We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We characterize the approximation error and we derive a new monotonicity condition for a broad category of games that encompasses the problem under consideration. Next, we propose a semi-decentralized algorithm to calculate the routing as a variational generalized Nash equilibrium and demonstrate the solution's benefits with numerical simulations. In the particular case of potential games, which emerges for linear latency functions, we explore a receding-horizon formulation of the routing problem, showing asymptotic convergence to destinations and analysing closed-loop performance dependence on horizon length through numerical simulations.
Keyword:
Traffic control
game theory
variational methods
期刊
IF:
8.4
论文数:
9.7K
被引数:
6.3W
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