Profiling Side-Channel Attack on HQC Polynomial Multiplication Using Machine Learning Methods

Tomáš Rabas

doi:10.1007/978-3-032-01405-4_24

Profiling Side-Channel Attack on HQC Polynomial Multiplication Using Machine Learning Methods

2026-01-01

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DOI：10.1007/978-3-032-01405-4_24

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The Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC) cryptosystem was selected for standardization in the 4th round of the NIST post-quantum standardization competition targeting Public-key Encryption and Key-establishment algorithms. In this paper, we propose a profiling power side-channel attack on a HQC cryptosystem exploiting power consumption leakage during polynomial multiplication in the beginning of the decryption. The new attack scheme is based on generic methods such as Welch's ANOVA test or multilayer perceptron with a grid-search algorithm used for the hyperparameter tuning. Consequently, it is easily extendable also to other side-channel attacks. Results of the practical evaluation are presented, using a 32-bit STM32F303 Arm Cortex-M4 processor as a target. We show that a trained model is able to recover the correct key bit from large majority of tests - in the practical evaluation, maximum 6 out of 20 000 tests failed in recovering the correct key bit. For the testing, we follow a single-trace scenario, which assumes that only one decryption power trace is available.

Keywords:

Side-Channel Attack

Polynomial Multiplication

HQC

Post-Quantum Cryptography

Machine Learning

Profiling Side-Channel Attack on HQC Polynomial Multiplication Using Machine Learning Methods

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