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Rational Opacity

delete2017-05-19
delete17
PRE
AI
C
Cyril Monnet
E
Erwan Quintin *
DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhx034delete
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摘要

摘要

En 中文
We present an environment in which long-term investors sometimes choose to restrict how much fundamental information they receive about the value of their investment to preserve its liquidity in secondary markets. When and only when there is a risk that secondary markets may be shallow, more information can reduce the expected payoff of agents who need to cash out early. Even given direct and costless control over information design, stakeholders choose to incentivize managers to withhold interim information. In such an environment, imposing transparency can lower investment and welfare.
Keyword:
INFORMATION
INVESTMENT
PRIVATE
BANKS
TRANSPARENCY
TRADE
RISK
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期刊

Review of Financial Studies 封面图
Review of Financial Studies
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.0W

机构

U
University of Bern
学者数:
4.0W
论文数: 3.1W
被引数: 4.8W
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