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Recommendations with Feedback
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DOI：10.1093/rfs/hhac019.png)
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We investigate the strategic role of a recommender who cares about accuracy and whose recommendations influence product quality. In the presence of such feedback effects, recommendations have a self-fulling property: the recommendation agent can select any firm that will end up being the firm with the best quality. This produces important inefficiencies that include (a) a lack of incentive to acquire valuable information, (b) a status quo bias, and (c) the avoidance of risky innovations. Monetary payments from firms may work in mitigating these inefficiencies, while competition between recommenders and monetary payments from consumers are ineffective.
Keyword:
D01
D83
D84
G24
期刊
IF:
5.4
论文数:
2.8K
被引数:
3.0W
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引用论文
Social value of public information: Comment: Morris and Shin (2002) is actually pro-transparency, not con.png)
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEWIF11.6
PREAI
分享收藏分享收藏A THEORY OF FADS, FASHION, CUSTOM, AND CULTURAL-CHANGE AS INFORMATIONAL CASCADES作为信息级联的时尚，时尚，习俗和文化变化的理论
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