.png){kind=icon}
返回
Regulating on-street parking
.png){kind=icon}
OA
AI
DOI：10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2005.04.002.png)
.png){kind=icon}
.png){kind=icon}
分享.png){kind=icon}
收藏
摘要
En 中文
Consider a shopper or tourist driving downtown and trying to park. Two strategies are usually available: either park at a private off-street facility or search for a cheaper on-street spot. We formalise Such a setting and use the model to Study Optimal government regulation of the on-street parking market. It is shown that the optimal on-street fee equals the marginal cost of off-street supply at the optimal quantity. If the off-street market is supplied under constant returns to scale, this provides a particularly simple operational rule: the price on street should match that off street. We also extend the model to consider maximum length of stay restrictions and non-competitive private supply. A numerical model, calibrated to central London, investigates the magnitude of an optimal fee. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
parking
regulating urban transport
search
AI总结
对已上传原文的论文进行重点信息的提取，主要内容包括：简要概述、研究摘要、背景介绍、关键亮点、图文解析、展望与总结。
期刊
IF:
2.9
论文数:
2.3K
被引数:
4.8K
机构
暂无机构信息
引用论文
.png){kind=icon}
分享收藏分享收藏
分享收藏 没有更多内容
没有更多内容