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Regulating securities analysts
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DOI：10.1016/j.jfi.2008.07.001.png)
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摘要
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We examine the effects of regulations designed to address the potential conflict of interest that arises when sell-side analyst research is not independent of investment banking. We focus on two types of regulation: (1) internal barriers between equity research and investment banking that restrict communication; and (2) disclosure requirements relating to analyst compensation. We find that information barriers can increase research effort and improve report quality by limiting an investment bank's ability to distort its analyst's incentives. However, this type of regulation can also reduce information production and lower the quality of reports if an investment bank benefits directly from research activity. Disclosure requirements, on the other hand, unambiguously lead to more informative prices and a higher report quality relative to either information barriers or no regulation. (C) 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keyword:
Analysts
Regulation
Disclosure
Investment banking
Recommendations
Conflict of interest
Information production
Career concerns
期刊
IF:
3.7
论文数:
777
被引数:
3.2K
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引用论文
Can Investors Profit from the Prophets? Security Analyst Recommendations and Stock Returns.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
分享收藏分享收藏Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry
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