REGULATION AND DISTRUST

doi:10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1015

REGULATION AND DISTRUST

2010-08-01

488

OA

AI

DOI：10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1015

原文链接

查看原文

摘要

En 中文

We document that, in a cross section of countries, government regulation is strongly negatively correlated with measures of trust. In a simple model explaining this correlation, distrust creates public demand for regulation, whereas regulation in turn discourages formation of trust, leading to multiple equilibria. A key implication of the model is that individuals in low-trust countries want more government intervention even though they know the government is corrupt. We test this and other implications of the model using country- and individual-level data on trust and beliefs about the role of government, as well as on changes in beliefs during the transition from socialism.

Keyword:

CULTURE

MARKET

REGULATION AND DISTRUST

摘要

AI总结

期刊

机构

引用论文