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Regulatory Capture's Self-Serving Application
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DOI：10.1111/puar.13390.png)
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Observers regularly assert that government regulations are captured-meaning the content of the regulation is diverted away from the public interest and toward the interests of regulated industry. I argue that the label of regulatory capture is often applied differently by policy losers than by policy winners. I hypothesize that when an entity is unsuccessful in achieving its goals during regulatory policy making, that entity is more likely to deem the process captured. With data from 41 FDA regulations and guidance documents, I find that-even when provided a common definition-those interest groups engaged in the same rulemaking vary as to whether or not they would categorize the process as captured. Moreover, this variation is negatively associated with whether the entity achieved its policy goals during the rulemaking. These findings imply that scholars ought to reassess capture's occurrence, as well as the political and policy implications attached to its invocation.
Keyword:
PUBLIC-INTEREST
FOOD
AGENCIES
ACCESS
期刊
IF:
4.9
论文数:
5.5K
被引数:
1.3W
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AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE CAPTURE THEORY OF REGULATION - THE CASE OF STATE PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONS
PREAI
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