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Relational Knowledge Transfers
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DOI：10.1257/aer.20160194.png)
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摘要
En 中文
We study how relational contracts mitigate Becker's classic problem of providing general human capital when training contracts are incomplete. The firm's profit-maximizing agreement is a multiperiod apprenticeship in which the novice is trained gradually over time and eventually receives all knowledge. The firm adopts a 1/e rule, whereby at the beginning of the relationship the novice is trained, for free, just enough to produce a fraction 1/e of the efficient output. After that, the novice earns all additional knowledge with labor. This rule causes inefficiently lengthy relationships that grow longer the more patient the players. A minimum wage is welfare enhancing.
Keyword:
OR-OUT CONTRACTS
IMPLICIT CONTRACTS
SECURITY DESIGN
CONTINUOUS-TIME
LABOR-MARKET
LIFE-CYCLE
INVESTMENT
FIRMS
INFORMATION
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11.6
论文数:
5.0K
被引数:
7.5W
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分享收藏分享收藏Optimal security design and dynamic capital structure in a continuous-time agency model.png)
JOURNAL OF FINANCE
JOURNAL OF FINANCEIF9.5
PREAI
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