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REVENUE-CAPPED EFFICIENT AUCTIONS
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DOI：10.1093/jeea/jvz015.png)
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摘要
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We study an auctionthat maximizes the expected social surplus under an upper-bound constraint on the seller's expected revenue, which we call a revenue cap. Such a constrained-efficient auction may arise, for example, when (i) the auction designer is pro-buyer, that is, he maximizes the weighted sum of the buyers' and seller's auction payoffs, where the weight for the buyers is greater than that for the seller; (ii) the auction designer maximizes the (unweighted) total surplus in a multiunit auction in which the number of units the seller owns is private information; or (iii) multiple sellers compete to attract buyers before the auction. We characterize the mechanisms for constrained-efficient auctions and identify their important properties. First, the seller sets no reserve price and sells the good for sure. Second, with a nontrivial revenue cap, bunching is necessary. Finally, with a sufficiently severe revenue cap, the constrained-efficient auction has a bid cap, so that bunching occurs at least at the top, that is, no distortion at the top fails.
Keyword:
OFFER AUCTIONS
BUY
COMPETITION
SELLERS
PRICES
MODEL
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3.3
论文数:
1.5K
被引数:
6.6K
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