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RISK-AVERSION IN CONTESTS

delete1995-07-01
delete80
PRE
AI
S
Stergios Skaperdas *
L
Li Gan
DOI:10.2307/2235161delete
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Abstract

Abstract

En 中文
In a contest, participants spend money or effort to increase their chances of winning a prize. We examine primarily the following question: Could the timid (the more risk averse) have a better chance of winning in contests ? Under limited liability the answer is always positive. In the absence of limited liability there is no single answer, whereas when the prize is shared as a function of effort the outcome is independent of the contestants' risk aversion. We also relate our results to self-protection and examine some other implications of risk aversion.
Keywords:
SELF-PROTECTION
INSURANCE
CONFLICT
POWER
AI Summary

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Journal

Economic Journal cover
Economic Journal
IF:
3.6
Papers:
5.5K
Citations:
1.6W

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